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In this excellent review of research 
concerning animal awareness, Donald 
Griffin, professor of animal behavior 
at The Rockefeller University, argues 
that animals can think and experience 
the same kind of mental processes and 
sensations that humans experience. In 
order to clarify the issue of consciousness 
in animals he begins with a set of working 
definitions: Thinking about objects and 
events that are remote in time and space 
from the immediate flux of sensations 
constitutes "mental experiences." These 
experiences include not only images, 
but also feelings, desires, hopes, fears, 
and a wide range of sensations such as 
pain, hunger, rage, and affection. An 
"intention" involves mental images of 
future events in which the intender 
pictures himself as a participant, and 
"consciousness" refers to the presence 
of ment~!~~~es and their use by 
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animals to regulate their own behavior 
(p. 5). The term 'awareness' is used 
to signify an entire set of interrelated 
mental images and experiences. He 
suggests that we regard mental experi­
ences, whatever their actual nature, as 
closely linked to neurophysiological 
processes within the brain. 
Griffin covers a range of philosophical 
and psychological theories that deny to 
animals any significant mental experiences. 
Our thinking about animals has been 
dominated by behavioristic and linguistic 
traditions in psychology. Given this 
framework mental concepts such as 
consciousness and awareness become use­
less to the scientific investigation of 
both humans and animals. He points out 
that the denial of mental experiences to 
animals has almost become an act of 
faith, usually supported by arguments 
connecting mental acts and thinking to 
language and true language to humans 
only. Animals are said to lack abstract 
or conceptual thought. Hampshire, for 
example, argues that it "would be sense­
less to attribute to an animal a memory 
that distinguished the order of events 
in the past, and it would be senseless 
to attribute to it an expectation of an 
order of events in the future. It does 
not have the concepts of order, or any 
concepts at all." Linguists generally 
regard animal communication as rigid 
and mechanically predictable, whereas 
human speech is not. Washoe and other 
chimpanzees are denied true minds either 
on the ground that they merely mimic the 
sign language of the deaf or that they 
have been taught this language by human 
trainers. 
Griffin contends that contrary to popular 
opinion, the extension and refinement of 
two-way communication between ethologists 
and animals will lead to a science of 
cognitive ethology. He cites several 
studies of the communication and behavior 
of bees, bats, and chimpanzees. Communi­
cation signals have included at least an 
announcement that the sender is of a 
given species, sex, and appropriate age, 
and is in one of a relatively few basic 
behavioral states such as readiness for 
fighting or fleeing. Chimpanzees have 
learned to use large vocabulariesoi 
gestures or manually manipulated symbols 
to communicate complex messages. Griffin 
points out that studies tend to show 
that apes are capable of intentionally 
conveying or withholding information 
from their companions. Griffin's own 
work with bats indicates that when flying 
through thoroughly familiar surroundings, 
many bats rely heavily on spatial memory 
rather than ecolocation, a behavior 
pattern that suggests conscious self­
awareness. 
The "dance speech" of honeybees turns out 
to be much more complex and flexible 
than generally assumed. There is no 
escape from the conclusion, says Griffin, 
that "in the special situation when swarming 
bees are in serious need of a new loca­
tion in which the colony can continue its 
existence, the bees exchange information­
tion about the location and suitability 
of potential hive location. • • • Only 
after many hours of such exchanges of 
information, involving dozens of bees, 
and only when the dances of virtually 
all the scouts indicate the same hive 
site, does the swarm as a whole fly off to 
it. This consensus results from communi­
cative interactions between individual 
bees which alternately 'speak' and 'listen.' 
But this impressive analogy to human 
linguistic exchanges is not even men­
tioned by most behavioral scientists" 
(p.	 23). 
Griffin admits that complexity of commu­
nication does not provide convincing evi­
dence for the existence of mental experi­
ences. However, combined with neuro­
physiological similarities to humans it 
does provide sufficient grounds for denying 
the uniqueness and superiority of human 
beings. It has, for example, been shown 
that the minor hemisphere of the human 
brain resembles an animal brain. The 
subordinate hemisphere carries out many 
mental functions considered to be conscious, 
but lacks the ability to report them in 
words. According to Griffin, such dis­
coveries add to the evidence for physiologi­
cal continuity between humans and animals 
in brain function and suggest a continuity 
in mental experiences: "To the extent 
that basic properties of neurons, synapses, 
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and neuroendocrine mechanisms are similar,
  
we might expect to find comparably
  
similar mental experiences" (p. 70).
  
Griffin points out that biological evolu­-
tion is universally accepted by behavioral 
scientists as a historical fact. Animals 
are used in research as "models" for 
medical and behavioral investigations on 
the implicit assumption that principles 
discovered in this way can be extrapolated 
to our own species. This type of research 
would not be productive if animals and 
humans differ in kind: "If, for example, 
human learning were believed to be radi­-
cally different in kind from that available 
for analysis in other animals, no one would 
even suggest applying to questions of human 
education what has been learned by studying 
rats, pigeons, or monkeys .•.• To argue 
that language is unique to man and, there­-
fore, no matter how complex animal commu­-
nication turns out to be, it cannot possibly 
be continuous with human language, is 
indefensibly circular" (p. 57). 
Griffin correctly notes that, one must be
  
cautious in describing animal behavior in
  
terms of mental experiences. We do not
  
have evidence for the identity of animal
  
experience and human experience. The
 
use of mental terminology to describe
  
animal behavior does not imply identity
  
with human mental experience, but does
  
signify a degree of similarity to it.
  
He concludes that the degree of
  
similarity or difference is an appro­
- 
priate question for future investigation.
  
Griffin has given us a lively and con­
- 
troversial book which merits critical
  
attention by those interested in ethology.
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